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CYBERSECURITY AND OFFSHORE OIL: 
THE NEXT BIG THREAT 
JAMIE CRANDAL* 
Abstract 
Since 9/11 and the resultant perpetuation of cyberterrorism in both the 
public and private sectors, there has been a push to institute regulations that 
serve to help prevent cyberterrorism. However, there has been little 
advancement in cybersecurity protocols for offshore oil platforms.  
This article serves as an insight into the current state of cybersecurity 
regulation concerning offshore oil platforms and cyberthreats. It also 
examines the potential development of a comprehensive regulatory 
framework and the consequential harms from failing to address the growing 
threat to such platforms.  
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I. Introduction  
The Deepwater Horizon Oil Rig (“Deepwater Horizon”) exploded on 
April 20, 2010.1 For eighty-seven days 134 million gallons of oil spilled into 
the Gulf of Mexico.2 As a result of the explosion eleven people died, and 
seventeen people sustained injuries.3 The spill left the Gulf states reeling with 
a disrupted coastal economy and a devastated ecosystem.4 BP PLC, 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Settlements: Where the Money Went-Explosion, 
Devastation, Decree, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (Apr. 20, 2017), 
https://www.noaa.gov/explainers/deepwater-horizon-oil-spill-settlements-where-money-
went. 
 2. Id.  
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration estimates the spill caused 
the death of as many as 105,400 sea birds and 167,600 sea turtles; approximately 8.3 billion 
oysters were lost. There was also 51-percent decrease in dolphins in Louisiana’s Barataria 
Bay. The spilled oil covered coral and marine life causing disruption to reproduction cycles 
and significant impacts on the fishing industry. The impacts of the spill on the health of those 
living in the most impacted areas are unknown. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol4/iss6/2
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Anadarko, TransOcean and Halliburton owned and operated the Deepwater 
Horizon.5 A $20.8 billion settlement in April of 2016 “ended all civil and 
criminal penalty claims against the owners and operators of the rig.”6 As of 
January of 2018, BP PLC again raised estimates for outstanding claims, and 
total costs escalated to $65 billion.7 While BP paid for the clean-up of the oil 
and paid the penalty for causing the disaster no amount of money will ever 
make up for the lives lost that day. The spill was the result of “poor risk 
management, last-minute changes to plans, failure to observe and respond to 
critical indicators, inadequate well control response and insufficient 
emergency bridge response training by companies and individuals 
responsible for drilling at the Macondo well and for the operation of the 
Deepwater Horizon.”8  
Hypothetically, what if the spill was not the result of a series of cascading 
operational failures but instead was the result of cascading cyberattacks that 
crippled the operations of the rig and started an explosion? If the federal 
government does not take stronger action to secure the country’s oil rigs a 
cyberattack on an American oil rig—that cripples its functions and causes 
fatalities, supply disruption, and millions of dollars of damage—is not only 
probable, but a near certainty.  
The worst route the industry and the government could take is to wait for 
a cyberattack to happen without adequate regulation in place to secure 
platforms. Mechanisms to ensure cybersecurity need development, whether 
it is industry standard or government regulations. This article evaluates the 
current trends in cybersecurity for offshore oil platforms. Currently, securing 
offshore oil platforms against cyberattack is based on industry standard and 
the assumption of cybersecurity measures into current security regulation 
rather than independent federal or state regulations. Certain scholars argue 
that industry standard is enough to guarantee that companies will actively 
work to secure their platforms,9 but the government cannot expect companies 
to base a cybersecurity protocol on shifting industry standards or an 
assumption of cybersecurity mandates in existing general security regulation. 
This article will outline the scope of cyberthreats that the oil and gas industry 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Ron Bousso, BP Deepwater Horizon Costs Balloon to $65 billion, REUTERS (Jan. 15, 
2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bp-deepwaterhorizon/bp-deepwater-horizon-costs-
balloon-to-65-billion-idUSKBN1F50NL. 
 8. John M. Broder, BP Shortcuts Led to Gulf Oil Spill, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
14, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/15/science/earth/15spill.html. 
 9. Richard Forno & Ann Hobson, infra note 125. 
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(specifically companies involved in offshore drilling) are facing; identify 
current industry standards and the federal regulations that are currently in 
place concerning or related to cybersecurity; and develop a basis for future 
cybersecurity regulation. 
A. Parameters of Research  
In order to streamline the research on this topic, this article only addresses 
the need for enhancements to the federal regulation scheme and industry 
standard concerning the cybersecurity of offshore oil platforms. While the 
regulation of offshore oil platforms occurs at the federal, international, and 
state level, an attempt to cover all governance would create confusion. Any 
governance at the international level would occur country by country, and 
any regulation enacted at the state level would occur state by state and could 
encompass other industries. In order to preempt any confusion this article 
adheres to examining federal cybersecurity regulation and domestic industry 
standards that could become a federal regulatory framework designed to 
ensure cybersecurity on offshore oil platforms. 
B. Defining the Terms Involved 
The following section defines terms used throughout this article. When 
used in this article the terms cybersecurity, cyberattack, and offshore oil 
platform carry the following meanings.  
Cybersecurity – In this context cybersecurity is defined as “[t]he 
prevention of damage to, unauthorized use of, or exploitation of, and, if 
needed, the restoration of electronic information and communications 
systems and the information contained therein to ensure confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability; includes protection and restoration, . . . of 
information networks and wireline, wireless, [and] satellite[s] . . . .”10 
Cyberattacks – Cyberattacks or “attacks” include both malicious and non-
malicious “‘hacks’ in which groups or individuals infiltrate, take over and 
destroy or virtually ‘hold hostage’ computer systems for nefarious 
purposes.”11 There are three general types of malicious cyberattacks: 
(1) hacktivism,” defined as “unauthorized digital intrusion to 
express a political agenda, [without intent] to create intimidation 
                                                                                                                 
 10. Baker Donelson et al., Maritime Cybersecurity Inland and Offshore – Avoiding “Paid 
Spies and Secret Confidential Agents on the Water of the Devil” and “Mere Dead Reckoning 
of the Error-Abounding Log”, JD SUPRA (Dec. 14, 2016), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/maritime-cybersecurity-inland-and-51369/ (internal 
citations omitted). 
 11. Id.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol4/iss6/2
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or fear”; (2) “cybercrime,” defined as “computer related crime 
referring to crimes committed through a computer” and (3) 
“cyberterrorism,” defined as “an unlawful attack against computer 
networks, to cause violence against persons or property, and as a 
result, to coerce a government.12 
In contrast, non-malicious attacks—also known as non-malicious security 
vulnerabilities—“may arise due to poor system architecture, failure to update 
systems (both hardware and software) and potential incompatibilities among 
various systems (i.e. a third party contractors’ software not properly syncing 
or potentially harming a vessel’s own systems).”13 Regardless of the 
innocence or malevolence of an attack both are still extremely dangerous and 
can result in the same amount of damage. 
Offshore oil platforms – The terms “offshore oil platform,” “offshore rig,” 
or “rig” for the purposes of this article all refer to the same thing. The most 
recognized technical term for an offshore oil platform is a “mobile offshore 
drilling unit.” A mobile offshore drilling unit (“MODU”) “is a unit capable 
of engaging in drilling operations for the exploration for, or exploitation of, 
resources beneath the seabed such as liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons, sulphur 
[sic], or salt.”14  
Definitions of other relevant terms occur throughout this article in specific 
sections. The terms defined here are throughout the entirety of the article.  
II. The Next Big Threat  
A. Offshore Oil Platforms or Appealing Target for Terrorism 
Despite changing opinions towards oil and an increasing desire for clean 
energy “natural gas output from offshore fields has risen by more than 50 
[percent] ” since 2000.15 Currently, “[m]ore than a quarter of today’s oil and 
gas supply is produced offshore.”16 Offshore oil platforms have always been 
a high-value target for both physical and cyberattacks.17 Terrorists base the 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Id. (internal citations omitted).  
 13. Id. (internal citations omitted).  
 14. INT'L MAR. ORG., Recommendations for the Training and Certification of Personnel 
on Mobile Offshore Units (MOUs) (Mar. 27, 2014), www.imo.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/ 
IndexofIMOResolutions/Assembly/Documents/A.1079(28).pdf. 
 15. Broder, supra note 8.  
 16. Int’l Energy Agency, The Future of Offshore Energy, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK-
OFFSHORE (May 4, 2018), https://www.iea.org/weo/offshore/. 
 17. Assaf Harel, Preventing Terrorist Attacks On Offshore Platforms: Do States Have 
Sufficient Legal Tools?, 4 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 131, 133-134 (2012). 
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value of these assets on “(1) their importance to many states in generating 
energy and income and (2) the severe damage an attack on such assets may 
inflict.”18 If an offshore oil platform comes under attack, the results could be 
catastrophic. An act of terrorism committed on a platform could interrupt a 
nation’s regular supply of energy, deprive a nation of an essential source of 
income, cause severe and long-term environmental damage, and result in 
significant loss of life.19  
Part of what makes offshore oil platforms such high-value targets to 
terrorists is their extreme vulnerability to physical and cyber assaults and 
incredible difficulty to protect.20 Platforms are vulnerable to physical attacks 
due to the following reasons. First, offshore platforms are extremely isolated 
due to the distance between platforms and/or the distance between a platform 
and the shore.21 Second, platforms deal with “large quantities of flammable 
liquids or gasses,” translating to an increase in the effectiveness of an attack 
regardless of the success of the attack on its own merits.22 Third, an offshore 
platform is not like a boat or transoceanic cargo carrier that can be 
maneuvered around or away from attackers; platforms are fixed to the ocean 
floor.23 
Malicious physical attacks are a continued threat to offshore platforms but 
cyberattacks are a method of attack which platforms are equally, if not more, 
susceptible to. Drilling rigs once isolated by geography are no longer as 
isolated as the industry believes them to be due to the interconnectivity of the 
platform to the shore. 
Automation technologies and the digital oilfield have made 
drilling rigs and all the equipment onboard much more 
interconnected than before. Look around any rig with PLC-based 
systems and you’ll[sic] likely find unsecured USB ports into 
which infected flash drives can be plugged. Maintenance laptops, 
which employees routinely use to surf the Internet or download 
movies when off-duty, are often hooked up to various rig systems 
without much consideration of potential cyber risks. Rigs also 
commonly provide remote access to multiple shore-based 
                                                                                                                 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 134 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. at 134-135 (internal citations omitted) 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol4/iss6/2
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facilities, whether for real-time operations support or equipment 
troubleshooting.24 
Part of the inherent fear associated with cyberattacks is the growing 
sophistication of hackers. If one attack fails, the next one improves on the 
last and is better able to penetrate or find a weakness in the system. Unless 
offshore oil platforms want to revert to wholly closed networks there is no 
way to guarantee that a rig can be safe from cyberterrorism. There is a 
dichotomy between the usefulness of connectivity and the danger of 
connectivity on platforms; “[w]e have taken the goodness of technology and 
all that it gives us – the efficiencies and safety – but we haven’t 
acknowledged the bad.”25 It has taken far too long for the industry to 
recognize the inherent danger of inadequate cybersecurity on offshore oil 
platforms.26 As a result, the days of a hypothetical threat of cyberattacks have 
long since passed, leaving us in an unsecured reality.  
B. Scope of the Threat  
In the 2018 Global Risks Report from the World Economic Forum, 
cyberattacks were third among the top five global risks in terms of 
likelihood.27 The report warns how cyberattacks are growing in prevalence 
and disruptive potential.28 Statistics have shown a significant uptick in 
attacks against businesses: over the last five years attacks have doubled and 
sophisticated attacks, that once seemed extraordinary, are now more and 
more commonplace.29 Criminals increasingly use cyberattacks to “target 
critical infrastructure and strategic industrial sectors, raising fears that, in a 
worst-case scenario, attackers could trigger a breakdown in the systems that 
keep societies functioning.”30 The oil and gas industry, specifically offshore 
oil platforms, are a regularly targeted part of the critical infrastructure of the 
United States. This section will examine multiple instances of cyberattacks 
that terrorists perpetrated across the globe and identify current vulnerabilities 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Linda Hsieh, Drilling cybersecurity, DRILLING CONTRACTOR (Sept. 8, 2015), 
http://www.drillingcontractor.org/drilling-cybersecurity-36727. 
 25. Id.  
 26. Id.  
 27. World Economic Forum [WEF], The Global Risks Report 2018, Figure IV: The 
Evolving Risks Landscapes (13th ed., 2018), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GRR18_ 
Report.pdf. 
 28. Id. at 6.  
 29. Id. 
 30. Id.  
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in offshore platforms. These attacks could represent potential threats to any 
one of the offshore oil platforms operated in the United States.  
C. Recent Cyberattacks 
Cyberattacks against offshore oil platforms cost companies millions of 
dollars of damages each year.31 However, the cost of a cyberattack on an oil 
rig, offshore or onshore, goes beyond damages. An attack on an oil rig is an 
attack on critical infrastructure and can ultimately “result in more than just 
lost revenue – it can be catastrophic for the environment and have far-
reaching impacts.”32 Having an understanding of the attacks that have taken 
place in recent years shows both the scope of the threat and how hard it is to 
combat cyberattacks without a protocol for cybersecurity in place.  
Huntington Beach, California, 2009 – In 2009, after one of the earliest 
recorded cyberattacks on an offshore platform, a Los Angeles federal grand 
jury indicted a disgruntled employee on “allegations of temporarily disabling 
a computer system detecting pipeline leaks for three oil derricks off the 
Southern California coast.”33 The employee faced a maximum ten year term 
after being accused of “purposely impairing a computer system that 
monitored for leaks.”34 This hack put the Southern California coastline in 
danger of a massive environmental disaster if a leak occurred while the 
system was inoperable.  
Turkey, 2008 – In August 2008, part of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (“BTC”) 
oil pipeline exploded.35 Initial government reports blamed mechanical 
failure.36 In 2010 subsequent investigation by the U.S. indicated that the 
explosion was actually the result of a cyberattack—once hackers achieved 
access to the pipelines network they wreaked havoc on the pipelines 
surveillance system; shut down alarms; and caused an explosion by super 
pressurizing the crude oil in the pipeline.37 According to court filings in the 
aftermath of the incident, “[t]he explosion caused more than 30,000 barrels 
                                                                                                                 
 31. Heidi Vella, Fighting Cyber Crime in the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry, OFFSHORE 
TECHNOLOGY (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.offshore-technology.com/digital-disruption/ 
cybersecurity/featurefighting-cyber-crime-in-the-offshore-oil-and-gas-industry-5692000/. 
 32. Hsieh, supra note 24.  
 33. David Kravets, Feds: Hacker Disabled Offshore Oil Platforms' Leak-Detection 
System, WIRED (Mar. 18, 2009), https://www.wired.com/2009/03/feds-hacker-dis/. 
 34. Id.  
 35. 2008 Turkish Oil Pipeline Explosion may have been Stuxnet Precursor, HOMELAND 
SEC. NEWS WIRE (Dec. 17, 2014) www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20141217-2008-
turkish-oil-pipeline-explosion-may-have-been-stuxnet-precurso. 
 36. Hsieh, supra note 24. 
 37. Id.  
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of oil to spill in an area above a water aquifer and cost BP and its partners 
$US5 million [sic] a day in transit tariffs during the closure.”38 In addition to 
private costs, the Republic of Azerbaijan suffered the highest losses, 
approximately one billion dollars.39  
Saudi Arabia, 2012 – In August 2012, hackers attacked the network of 
Saudi Arabia’s oil and natural gas firm, Saudi Aramco, by launching the 
Shamoon virus on the company’s network.40 In a matter of hours hackers 
partially wiped or completed destroyed 35,000 computers.41 While the attack 
did not result in a major explosion or oil spill, the ramifications were severe 
and long-lasting.42 Almost instantaneously, a cyberattack put Saudi Aramco's 
ability to supply ten percent of the world's oil at risk.43 Over the course of 
two weeks, Saudi Aramco production “remained steady at 9.5 million barrels 
per day…[b]ut the rest of the business was in turmoil,”44 as “[o]ne of the most 
valuable companies on Earth was propelled back into 1970s technology, 
using typewriters and faxes.”45 It took five months before the company was 
back online.46 While Saudi Aramco did not publicize the exact cost incurred 
as a result of the attack a company insider alleged, “[a]n attack of that size 
would have easily bankrupted a smaller corporation.”47 The attackers 
escaped identification and prosecution.48  
South Korea, 2010 – In a non-targeted attack, a newly built, offshore rig 
in transit from South Korea suffered a devastating security breach.49 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Jordon Robertson & Michael Riley, Before Stuxnet, Refahiye Pipeline Blast in Turkey 
Opened New Cyberwar Era, SUNDAY MORNING HERALD (December 12, 2014), 
https://www.smh.com.au/world/before-stuxnet-refahiye-pipeline-blast-in-turkey-opened-
new-cyberwar-era-20141212-125nvy.html (citing James Marriott & Mika Minio-Paluello, 
The Oil Road: A Journey to the Heart of the Energy Economy, VERSO (2012)). 
 39. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 40. Christopher Bronk & Eneken Tikk-Ringas, The Cyber Attack on Saudi Aramco, 55 
SURVIVAL 81, 81 (April 3, 2013), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00396338. 
2013.784468?scroll=top&needAccess=true. 
 41. Jose Pagliery, The Inside Story of the Biggest Hack in History, CNN BUSS. (Aug. 5, 
2015), https://money.cnn.com/2015/08/05/technology/aramco-hack/index.html. 
 42. Bronk & Tikk-Ringas, supra note 40. 
 43. Pagliery, supra note 41. 
 44. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id.  
 47. Id.  
 48. Id.  
 49. Hsieh, supra note 24. See also Sonja Swanbeck, Coast Guard Commandant 
Addresses Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities on Offshore Oil Rigs, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L 
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Completely overwhelmed by malware, multiple computers malfunctioned, 
taking out the blowout preventer system (“BOP”).50 It took nineteen days for 
technicians to bring the rig back online.51 The consequences of the rig going 
into operation with the malware still on the network could have been 
catastrophic. Little information is available about the costs associated with 
the incident or steps taken to prevent a similar incident from happening again.  
African Coast, 2015 – The latest malicious cyberattack occurred when 
hackers “caused an oil rig off the coast of Africa to tilt to one side, shutting 
down production for a week as engineers worked to identify and fix the 
issue.”52 Mike Ahmadi, global director for critical systems security at 
Synopsys, was speaking to a researcher who pointed out the vulnerabilities 
of the control systems responsible for managing the pontoons that keep 
offshore rigs afloat.53 If a hacker infiltrated a pontoon control system they 
could drain the “ballast on one side, causing the platform to tilt over in the 
opposite direction;” the result of such an attack would cripple, if not 
completely destroy, a rig.54 
In addition to malicious cyberattacks, there have also been recent non-
malicious attacks. Non-malicious or friendly attacks probe industry systems 
to better understand vulnerabilities; some friendly attacks are intentional, 
while some are the result of the inherent weaknesses of the system being 
tested every time an employee connects his laptop to the platform’s network 
to watch Netflix in his time off. An “incident was just cited this summer by 
the US Coast Guard (USCG), where malware was mistakenly downloaded 
onto a [mobile offshore drilling unit] MODU.”55 As a result, this malware  
“impacted the dynamic positioning system which resulted in the 
need for an emergency breakaway to avoid an accident,” Captain 
Drew Tucci, Chief for the USCG Office of Ports and Facilities, 
said. “That incident does not appear to have been from a targeted 
                                                                                                                 
STUDIES (Jun. 22, 2015), https://www.csis.org/blogs/strategic-technologies-blog/coast-guard-
commandant-addresses-cybersecurity-vulnerabilities. 
 50. Id. A blowout preventer system is a series of safeguards on a rig which “shuts off the 
valve leading underneath the machinery to stop any liquid from surfacing in a dangerous 
explosion, or a kick,” The Role of the Blowout Preventer (BOP) in Drilling Operations, 
KEYSTONE ENERGY TOOLS, https://www.keystoneenergytools.com/the-role-of-the-blowout-
preventer-bop-in-drilling-operations/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2019). 
 51. Id.  
 52. Baker Donelson et al., supra note 10 (internal citations omitted).  
 53. Vella, supra note 31. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Hsieh, supra note 24. 
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foreign company or terrorist organization that was trying to cause 
an accident. It appears that it may have been caused simply by 
poor cyber practices onboard the vessel.”56 
These incidents on offshore platforms and in the oil and gas industry show 
terrorists already possess the capability to infiltrate networks on offshore oil 
platforms; moreover, how poor cyber protocols on platforms can result in an 
accident equivalent to a terrorist attack. The issue of cybersecurity regulation 
on offshore oil platforms is not just an issue for an industry or a company; it 
is a universal issue that could result in a global threat. Even though “[t]he 
industry is generally keen to play down the actual risk of such threats, . . . [i]t 
is not unreasonable to believe there could be a kinetic response to a cyber-
attack that would see countries go to war . . . .”57  
III. Recognition of the Threat 
A. Limited Governmental Recognition  
For cybersecurity regulation to pass through the House of Representatives 
and Senate and get signed into law by the President, all levels of federal 
government must understand the risk cyberterrorism poses to offshore 
platforms; and the lack of regulation in place to protect them. Rear Adm. Paul 
Thomas, Assistant Commandant for U.S. Coast Guard Prevention Policy, 
with Brian Salerno, Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement 
Director, in a panel addressing their regulatory stances and joint agency 
initiatives for offshore safety proffered, when it comes to cybersecurity:  
[T]he worst path is to wait for something bad to happen and 
responsively pass a law, which would potentially be the most 
expensive approach. I’ve been encouraging industry to start 
tackling this issue because I believe if you wait until we have a 
real cyber incident, it’s going to be fast, painful and expensive.58 
Yet, the worst path, according to Rear Adm. Thomas is the exact path that 
is being taken. While the federal government is supportive of cultivating 
industry guidance not one branch of the federal government is willing to put 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Id.  
 57. Vella, supra note 31 (internal citations omitted).  
 58. Lt. Jodie Knox, 5/21/2015: 2015 Offshore Technology Conference – Complexity of 
Operations and Cyber, COAST GUARD MARITIME COMMONS (May 21, 2015), 
http://mariners.coastguard.dodlive.mil/2015/05/21/5212015-2015-offshore-technology-
conference-complexity-of-operations-and-cyber/. 
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the force of law behind the guidance. It is not just Rear Adm. Paul Thomas 
who is calling for action in the oil and gas industry with little effect. Former 
President Obama and President Trump have both recognized the danger that 
cyberterrorism poses to the nation. President Barack Obama, during National 
Cybersecurity Awareness Month in 2016, emphasized “[k]eeping cyberspace 
secure is a matter of national security, and in order to ensure we can reap the 
benefits and utility of technology while minimizing the dangers and threats 
it presents, we must continue to make cybersecurity a top priority.”59 The 
Trump Administration, while advocating for significant deregulation of the 
industry, even recognized “[t]he Federal Government has the responsibility 
to . . . to ensure America has the best cybersecurity in the world. Failures to 
prioritize cybersecurity by both government and industry have left our Nation 
less secure.”60  
 While limited outcry for change has come from executive branch 
politicians (and those responsible for industry oversight), there is little 
movement from the House of Representatives or the Senate to tackle the big 
cybersecurity issues that are putting national security and environmental 
sustainability at risk. Stated more directly, the “U.S. still lacks regulation on 
cybersecurity standards in the oil and gas industry, the way it has for nuclear, 
power, and chemicals” in the past.61 There is no question that the industry as 
a whole is not adequately prepared for a coordinated cyberattack on offshore 
platforms; and the federal government as a whole is not acting to fix the 
threat. 
B. Industry Recognition 
The oil and gas industry recognized a need to modernize cybersecurity 
protocols over the last six years. However, unlike government, where 
regulation can remain stuck in a political log jam, industry has the ability to 
swiftly enact change. Despite this, industry is facing its own challenges in 
trying to strengthen cybersecurity systems and protocols. A 2017 study done 
by the Ponemon Institute demonstrates this fact. The Institute surveyed 377 
individuals from the oil and gas industry who oversee cybersecurity 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Proclamation No. 9508, 81 Fed. Reg. 69, 371 (Sept. 30, 2016). 
 60. Grant Schneider, President Trump Unveils America’s First Cybersecurity Strategy in 
15 Years, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
articles/president-trump-unveils-americas-first-cybersecurity-strategy-15-years/. 
 61. Tsvetana Parakova, Oil Industry Neglected Cybersecurity During the Downturn, 
OILPRICE.COM (Apr. 12, 2018, 5:00PM), https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-
News/Oil-Industry-Neglected-Cybersecurity-During-The-Downturn.html. 
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operations for their employers.62 The survey found the following: (1) 
“[s]ixty-eight percent of respondents said their organization had experienced 
at least one cyber compromise;” (2) “[a] total of 67 percent of respondents 
believe the risk level to industrial control systems over the past few years has 
substantially increased because of cyber threats;” (3) “[s]ixty-six percent 
believe that oil and gas companies are benefiting from digitalization, but that 
it has also significantly increased cyber risks;” (4) “[o]nly 61 percent of 
respondents say their organization has the internal expertise to manage cyber 
threats.”63 These numbers illustrate the disconnect in the oil and gas industry 
between taking action and feeling disheartened with the limited resources 
available for such a complex problem.  
In discussing cyber threats offshore, the former Control System Security 
Manager for National Oilwell Varco noted, “[d]rilling systems are designed 
around the theory of an isolated network – that the hundreds of miles of ocean 
and the physical barriers to get to the rig constituted sufficient security to 
make sure they couldn’t be compromised.”64 The theory that offshore oil 
platforms were an impenetrable offshore network meant companies spent 
neither corporate time or money on improving cybersecurity or creating 
cybersecurity protocols to keep pace with advancing technology. There is no 
longer validity in the assumption cybersecurity is built into every system on 
an offshore platform. In 2017 Deloitte found, “[t]he oil and gas production 
operation ranks highest on cyber vulnerability in upstream operations, mainly 
because of its legacy asset base, which was not built for cybersecurity but has 
been retrofitted and patched in bits and pieces over the years, and lack of 
monitoring tools on existing networks.”65 Regarding offshore facilities, 
“approximately 42 percent . . . worldwide have been operational for more 
than 15 years, fewer than half of [oil and gas] companies use monitoring tools 
on their networks, and of those companies that have these tools, only 14 
percent have fully operational security monitoring centers.”66 These numbers 
are unacceptable. If a competent hacker finds an exploitable weakness across 
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multiple platforms approximately fifty-five percent that do not use 
monitoring tools risk having a Deepwater Horizon level blowout.  
Furthermore, for all the recent recognition cybersecurity has gotten from 
industry insiders’ companies are still not spending money on upgrading and 
updating protocols. “Two prominent security consultant firms estimate that 
energy companies, ranging from drillers to pipeline operators to utilities, 
invest less than 0.2 percent of their revenue in cyber security [sic].”67 For 
perspective, “that’s at least a third less than the corresponding figure for 
banks and other financial institutions.”68 While there has been an uptick in 
cybersecurity spending by these companies the money put towards the 
problems has done little to actually curb the amount of attacks that are 
occurring throughout the industry and on offshore oil platforms. 
Additionally, “what makes the lack of investment even more worrisome is 
that the number of hacker groups targeting the energy sector is soaring. [One 
company is] tracking at least 140 groups, up from 87 in 2015, some with 
links to foreign countries.”69 The threat to platforms will not go away and it 
will not dissipate. The oil and gas industry recognizes the next big threat to 
its platforms but it is not doing enough to stop the threat from becoming a 
reality. 
IV. Prior Additions to Federal Regulation Concerning Offshore Oil 
Platforms 
A. Protection Against Other Types of Terrorism 
A large body of international laws and regulations allows companies 
operating offshore oil rigs to protect those rigs from terrorist attack. As 
previously discussed, offshore oil platforms have long been an appealing 
target for terrorist attacks.70 International law, specifically maritime law and 
the law of the seas, outline and clarify the legal avenues that companies can 
use to protect their rigs from external and internal terrorist attacks.71 First, 
international law protects offshore platforms from terrorist attacks in the 
following way.  
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Although vessels of all [nation]states are entitled to exercise 
innocent passage in a state's territorial sea [500-meter-wide safety 
zone] the law of the sea provides coastal states with the authority 
to take measures to promote safety and security within that area. 
States may use this authority for preventing terrorist attacks on 
offshore platforms located within the territorial sea.72 
Second, international law provides states the “legal authority necessary for 
protecting offshore platforms from attack.”73 Basically coastal states have the 
ability to “invoke the right of self-defense to justify restrictions on navigation 
near its offshore platforms” under international law if the platform is under 
the threat of imminent attack.74 When it comes to physical assaults on 
offshore oil platforms owners and operators can look to international law for 
clear regulation that guide a company’s ability to protect themselves from 
impending attack. There is no regulatory equivalent regarding a cyber 
assault. There is no clear regulation at the international level (or within the 
United States) that explicitly states the rights and responsibilities a company 
has to protect against cyberattack the way that international law explicitly 
outlines how a company can protect itself against a physical assault. 
B. Regulatory Reaction to Deepwater Horizon 
Following Deepwater Horizon, also known as the Macondo Disaster, the 
federal government inundated the industry with regulation to prevent another 
catastrophe, but the new regulations did not encompass cybersecurity. In the 
middle of the disaster, “with the Macondo well still gushing untold millions 
of barrels of oil into the Gulf and in the midst of an unprecedented six-month 
deep-water drilling moratorium prompted by the blowout, President Obama 
made it clear that the post-Macondo regulatory world would be a very 
different place.”75 One of the first moves was restructuring the organizations 
that govern the regulation of offshore platforms, which was already starting 
at the time of the disaster.  
[T]he acting Secretary of the Interior, announced the separation of 
the responsibilities performed by the Bureau of Ocean Energy 
Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE), the 
entity that had replaced the disgraced MMS in June 2010 by 
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Salazar's [Secretary of the Interior’s] order, into three new 
separate organizations: Office of Natural Resources Revenue 
(ONRR, an entirely separate office under the Assistant Secretary 
for Policy, Management and Budget responsible for revenue and 
royalty concerns), Bureau of Ocean Energy Management 
(BOEM), and Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement 
(BSEE).76 
The result being the regulation of platforms at the federal level falls under 
the regulatory umbrella of the United States Coast Guard (“USCG”) and the 
Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (“BSEE”).77 As a 
necessary and logical starting point, “the USCG and BSEE…entered into 
nine separate Memoranda of Understanding and Memoranda of 
Agreement.”78 These agreements provide “a bird's eye view of how the 
USCG and BSEE approach their roles in regulating OCS [Outer Continental 
Shelf] activities and also highlight some of the inherent overlaps and gray 
areas in the new regulatory regime.”79 While the USCG is the overarching 
governing body, the BSEE is designed to “be responsible for safety and 
environmental enforcement functions;” these functions include “the 
authority to permit activities, inspect, investigate, summon witnesses and 
produce evidence: levy penalties; cancel or suspend activities; and oversee 
safety, response and removal preparedness.”80 While there are a number of 
overlapping areas of governance, areas with unclear lines of authority have 
caused confusion and left gaps in the regulatory framework. Based on the 
regulatory framework post-Macondo any new cybersecurity regulation will 
likely go through or be monitored by the USCG and the BSEE. Increasing 
the regulation of offshore drilling platforms was a natural move on the part 
of the government following Deepwater Horizon to prevent a similar 
disaster. Creating or reinforcing cybersecurity regulation following multiple 
cyberattacks across the world should be the natural next step before a cyber-
Macondo occurs.  
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V. Inadequacies of Existing Regulations and Industry Guidance Concerning 
Cybersecurity of Offshore Oil Platforms 
While international, federal, and state law all work together to regulate 
offshore oil platforms, most of the work that is currently taking place 
concerning cybersecurity regulation occurs at the federal level. An 
examination of what regulation is in existence at the federal level, that many 
inaccurately assume will adequately protect platforms from offshore attacks, 
is important. One scholar argues:  
Notwithstanding the tide of regulators’ informal literature on 
cybersecurity, there are currently no specific, discrete 
cybersecurity regulations for either offshore or inland vessel 
operations. However, existing regulatory frameworks likely 
encompass issues of cybersecurity for offshore and inland vessel 
operators, even if they do not specifically address cybersecurity 
as such.81 
It is not enough to say that existing regulations encompass issues of 
cybersecurity for offshore oil platforms. Cybersecurity is a complex issue 
that that requires an independent regulatory framework. The following 
sections address why existing regulations—including Maritime Security 
Regulations, Best Available and Safest Technologies Program, and industry 
guidance—is not enough to ensure the cybersecurity of America’s platforms. 
A. Maritime Security Regulations  
Baker Donelson asserts that the most relevant body of regulation, the 
Maritime Security Regulations (“MARSEC Regulations”), that stem from 
the Maritime Transportation Security Act (“MTSA”), cover requirements for 
the cybersecurity of offshore oil platforms. This assertion of the Baker 
Donelson firm is not accurate. 
As it stands, MARSEC Regulations, are applicable “to all vessels 
(including MODUs) and OCS facilities in/on the waters subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States”82 The MARSEC Regulations came into 
existence with three primary aims. Those aims include:  
1) To implement portions of the maritime security regime required 
by the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, as codified 
in 46 U.S.C. Chapter 701; 
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(2) To align, where appropriate, the requirements of domestic 
maritime security regulations with the international maritime 
security standards in the International Convention for the Safety 
of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS Chapter XI–2) and the International 
Code for the Security of Ships and of Port Facilities, parts A and 
B, adopted on 12 December 2002; and 
(3) To ensure, security arrangements are as compatible as possible 
for vessels trading internationally.83 
The third aim of the MARSEC Regulations is the most important in this 
context. It is applicable to all vessels subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States:84 Some argue, that in the context of the statute, the requirement to 
“ensure security arrangements” includes the need to ensure cybersecurity 
arrangements, and furthermore vessels include offshore oil platforms. 
Because the provision is inclusive of cybersecurity no other regulation is 
necessary. 
Additional language that allegedly includes cybersecurity includes the 
need for offshore oil platforms owners to: 
“[e]nsure that security systems and equipment are installed and 
maintained” on their vessels and facilities and designate a 
qualified.” Company Security Officer (CSO) tasked with ensuring 
various aspects of vessel or facility security, including “[s]ecurity 
equipment and systems and their operational limitations” and 
“[r]elevant international conventions, codes, and 
recommendations,” which now include specific codes regarding 
cybersecurity.85 
Under the Donelson theory, rig operators read “security systems” to 
include cybersecurity despite the complete lack of further guidance that 
would indicate what the installation or maintenance of a cybersecurity system 
involves. Furthermore, Vessels Reporting Requirements 33 C.F.R. §104.235 
requires the vessel security officer to keep records of different incidents 
concerning safety equipment: since the UCSG defined security “‘incidents’86 
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and ‘breaches’87 to specifically include cybersecurity breaches/incidents”88 
in the reporting requirement the conclusion that follows is that all regulations 
related to security must be read to include the necessary cybersecurity 
systems. 
While it is tempting for the offshore oil community to try to read 
MARSEC regulations to include cybersecurity into provisions concerning 
general security matters it is not appropriate to do so. A plain text reading of 
the statute does not lead to the conclusion that cybersecurity is included in 
the meaning. The only indication that the statute includes cybersecurity 
comes from codes in a niche piece of regulation that differentiates between 
security breaches/incidents and cybersecurity breaches/incidents. Even if the 
statute is viewed in isolation, the argument that cybersecurity is appropriately 
grounded under the general security arm of the regulation is not appropriate 
due to the complex nature of the systems involved in cybersecurity. A new 
protocol must go beyond simple reporting requirement and read-ins. 
Companies deserve to know the exact measures they are responsible for 
taking to try and preempt a cyberattack. Companies cannot read into 
regulation requirements for cybersecurity systems that are not explicit. There 
is a difference between the mandatory security measures that MARSEC 
explicitly includes and a read in of cybersecurity regulations that gives 
companies no guidance as to what elements a cybersecurity system needs to 
include. This reading of MARSEC Regulations is the closest regulatory 
framework for cybersecurity of offshore oil platforms that exists at the 
federal level, and it is in no way adequate to be the governing regulation. 
B. Best Available and Safest Technologies Program 
The second area of federal regulation that encompasses cybersecurity of 
offshore oil platforms is the Best Available and Safest Technologies 
(“BAST”) Program under the BSEE. The BAST Program comes under What 
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must I do to protect health, safety, property, and the environment? 30 C.F.R. 
§ 250.107. The BAST Program: 
establishes a process for fulfilling the provisions of the Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”), Amendments . . . which 
requires offshore operators to use BAST whenever practical on all 
exploration, development, and production operations when failure 
of equipment would have a significant effect or impact on safety, 
health, or the environment.89 
BSEE further acknowledges that in accordance with the OCSLA, BSEE 
has the ability to initiate a BAST Determination Process to evaluate safety, 
health or environmental concerns.90 Based on the cyberthreats and attacks on 
platforms and pipelines over the last several years, a cyberattack on an 
offshore oil platform could constitute a significant threat worthy of the 
initiation of a BAST Determination Process. BAST may be the best means 
for creating regulation. A BAST determination by the BSEE would require 
offshore oil platform operators to “use technology that meets the BAST 
Program performance requirement(s) on new and, wherever practicable, 
existing operations.”91 A BAST Program determination would give 
companies a clear idea of what technology is necessary to ensure 
cybersecurity of offshore platforms. Another perk is the process focuses on 
“the establishment of performance level(s).”92 Establishing performance 
levels rather than a set standard allows a fluidity to requirements that matches 
the fluid and evolving nature of cyberthreats. A BAST Determination 
Process involves seeking guidance of government, industry, and academia 
and takes relevant economic factors into account.93 This level of stakeholder 
involvement in creating regulation creates an automatic buy in for all 
stakeholders. Companies in the oil and gas industry could not as easily flaunt 
a regulation that they helped develop. While BAST is one of the best options 
for creating cybersecurity protocols the federal government has not used 
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BAST to promulgate such regulations as of this writing. An outstanding 
option for regulatory framework is completely inadequate to secure offshore 
oil platforms from cyberattack if not used.  
C. Position of Industry Regulators 
As noted, offshore oil platform operators currently use MARSEC as the 
basis for a federal regulatory framework when looking for guidance; but 
companies in the industry can also look to the stances of the federal regulators 
who are responsible for the governance of regulation of offshore oil 
platforms, specifically the USCG and the BSEE. For its part, the USCG has 
“expressly noted that existing regulations may encompass cybersecurity 
concerns and has called for public comments on ‘how to identify and mitigate 
potential vulnerabilities to cyber-dependent systems’ in the marine 
industry.”94 This stance, while understandable, is not in the best interest of 
companies that look to the USCG for guidance.  
The BSEE “has largely followed the USCG's lead in this area.”95 That said, 
the USCG has put forth to the BSEE—due to the shared regulatory authority 
of the agencies—“the issue of whether BSEE's Safety and Environmental 
Management Systems (SEMS) regulations should expressly include 
cybersecurity provisions.”96 Additionally, the BSEE “formally 
acknowledge[s] that it is certainly appropriate to factor cyber safety into your 
overall SEMS planning.”97 These are the two main agencies responsible for 
ensuring the safe operation of offshore oil platforms. Based on the comments 
and stances of the USCG and the BSEE the use of the existing regulatory 
framework is simply stop-gap regulation to push companies into having a 
stop-gap cybersecurity protocol that mollifies lawmakers and regulators 
alike. 
 
D. Industry Guidance 
Several organizations and agencies, prominent authorities in the offshore 
oil and gas industry, created cybersecurity protocols to guide companies in 
the creation of their own protocols and policies. These protocols are 
important to the furtherance of future regulations and to evaluate the current 
tools available to companies.  
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There are three primary sets of guidance. The first, is the Interim 
Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk Management (“IMCO”). This four-page 
set of guidelines from the International Maritime Organization is designed to 
“provide high-level recommendations on maritime cyber risk management 
to safeguard shipping from current and emerging cyberthreats and 
vulnerabilities. The guidelines also include functional elements that support 
effective cyber risk management.”98 The problem with this industry guidance 
is that is designed for shipping not the oil and gas industry, and not offshore 
oil platforms. As a result, it provides little more than broad strokes of insight 
that can tangentially provide suggestions for offshore platforms. One size 
does not fit all, guidance for shipping is not going to provide adequate 
guidance for an offshore oil platform that runs completely different software 
and is susceptible to completely different threats.  
The second primary guidance is the US National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (“NIST”) Framework. The Framework stems from the 
Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 (“CEA”).99 CEA updated the role 
of NIST “to include identifying and developing cybersecurity risk 
frameworks for voluntary use by critical infrastructure owners and 
operators.”100 It “focuses on using business drivers to guide cybersecurity 
activities and considering cybersecurity risks as part of the organization’s 
risk management processes;” but, it “is not a one-size-fits-all approach to 
managing cybersecurity for critical infrastructure.101 Organizations will 
continue to face unique risks and use unique technologies that will cause 
deviations from the standard framework.102 Since the Framework was 
released in February of 2014 industries began to integrate it by creating 
industry-focused framework profiles.103 The USCG worked with the oil and 
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gas industry to develop a Cybersecurity Framework Profile for Offshore 
Operations (“CFPFOP”).104 The CFPFPOP is comprehensive it “defines the 
desired minimum state of cybersecurity by identifying the minimum set of 
Cybersecurity Framework Categories and Subcategories for each of the 
twelve Mission Objectives required to conduct Offshore Operations in a 
more secure manner.”105 The existence of the CFPFPOP is a dramatic step 
toward giving companies who operate offshore oil platforms comprehensive 
guidelines to establish cybersecurity protocols. BUT the NIST Framework106 
and the CFPFPOP107 are completely voluntary and are not legally binding. 
Furthermore, both NIST and the CFPFPOP are relatively new, released in 
2014 and 2017 respectively, based on spending reports of offshore oil 
platform owners108 they will not voluntarily spend the money to implement 
such a comprehensive plan without evidence that the framework actually 
helps prevent cyberattacks. 
The third and final guidance comes from the American Bureau of Shipping 
(ABS), “the USCG’s primary third-party regulatory enforcement delegate 
whose standards have been widely incorporated by reference in existing 
USCG regulations.”109 The ABS CyberSafety series is a five volume and 
highly detailed “management program for asset owners to apply best practice 
approaches to cyber security, automated systems safety, data integrity and 
software verification.”110 Three volumes are specific to offshore vessel 
operations.111 The most important parts of the series, specifically the volumes 
concerning offshore vessel operations, are the guidelines that layout the 
procedure for companies to obtain an “ABS CyberSafety Management 
System Certificate (CMSC, for a company's cybersecurity management 
system) and Certificate of Cyber Compliance (CCC, for specific vessels or 
facilities),” certifying that their vessel operations are cyber secure.112  
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The ABS CyberSafety certificate  
“[is] not [intended to be] required as a condition for ABS Class,” 
but is offered as “a useful indication of the due diligence applied 
by owners to better prepare for cybersecurity concerns affecting 
ships, offshore assets and their associated shoreside facilities.” 
This certification process involves annual assessments “when 
there are major cyber-enabled, safety-related networked system 
configuration changes,” including (without limitation) “major-
version number operating system or firmware changes in either 
OT or IT; control system changeouts in safety-critical systems; or 
combined configuration changes between or among two or more 
systems that control safety-critical systems”; and otherwise 
during multi-year class survey events. The assessment process 
focuses on documentation of a cyber safety management system, 
as well as extensive record-keeping “of all modifications, 
maintenance and system security or configuration updates and 
upgrades, including any outstanding help desk tickets or 
vendor/integrator repair or maintenance requirements, and any 
insecurities or breaches.”113 
Additionally the three-tiered certification program focuses on nine areas of 
competency: (1) Exercise Best Practices, (2) Build the Security Organization, 
(3) Provision for Employee Awareness and Training, (4) Perform Risk 
Assessment, (5) Provide Perimeter Defense, (6) Prepare for Incident 
Response and Recovery, (7) Provide Physical Security, (8) Execute Access 
Management and (9) Maintain Asset Management.114 This program, if 
converted into a regulatory standard, could easily be the cornerstone of the 
necessary federal regulation that would secure offshore oil platforms from 
cyberattacks. If all companies were to subject themselves to a standard 
similar to the one promulgated by ABS, then companies could find 
reassurance, knowing that active steps have been taken to secure platforms. 
E. Conclusion 
In the above explanations of available frameworks for cybersecurity of 
offshore oil platforms, industry and government alike must recognize that no 
regulation currently forces companies to act to secure their cyber welfare. 
There is no guarantee that companies will read cybersecurity into MARSEC 
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regulation; follow the NIST Framework or CFPFPOP; or follow the guidance 
of NGOs or BSEE-affiliated regulatory advisors such as ABS. Deepwater 
Horizon clearly showed that the oil and gas industry will not self-regulate 
when profits are at stake.115 BP “was less than meticulous about safety (other 
people and their property, that is) while it and its industry effectively vetoed 
government safeguards that might have prevented the explosion.”116 
Academics argue, “[c]orporate self-regulation without effective government 
oversight will not adequately reduce the risk of accidents with the offshore 
oil exploration industry.”117 There is nothing to support that corporate self-
regulation on its own will adequately reduce the risk of cyberattacks on 
offshore oil platforms. Companies have guidance at their disposal, but until 
this guidance has the force of law behind it the federal government is leaving 
the security of the nation’s platforms to chance.  
VI. Moving Forward to Secure Cybersecurity Regulation  
There is a lot of potential industry guidance available for the federal 
government to turn into mandatory cybersecurity regulation of offshore oil 
platforms. One available option is use existing MARSE regulations to create 
a floor for what companies need to do to secure rigs. A second option is to 
leave the regulation to industry best practice and standard. Industry practice 
can come from NGOs, ABS, NIST, or USCG. All the previously described 
available industry standard has yet to inspire either the Houser of 
Representatives or Senate to put forth cybersecurity regulation for offshore 
oil platforms. Other aspects of critical infrastructure such as the power grid118 
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and the water sector119 are legally bound by specific federal cybersecurity 
regulation or combination of federal and state cybersecurity regulation. 
While other critical infrastructure has detailed, infrastructure specific, legally 
binding regulation; offshore platforms do not. This translates to offshore 
platforms being at higher risk for attack. 
A. Determining the Appropriate Regulation 
 The USCG in 2015 expected industry to begin to bear the brunt of the 
burden in protecting themselves without stated governmental standards.120 
Three years later, “the recent spate of industry standards issued by high 
profile maritime governance and standards bodies may very well be destined 
for incorporation into the” Code of Federal Regulations (“C.F.R.”).121 Any 
future regulation must balance the government’s interest in guidance and 
oversight against the risk that static rules will become obsolete.122 Any 
regulation that does not strike a balance runs the risk of forcing companies 
into a hole that they cannot get out of, where regulation causes companies to 
“focus their defenses on a limited number of types of attacks or business 
activities to the detriment of other existing or emerging needs.”123 There is 
also a chance that such rules might create an exploitable window into 
industry defenses, resulting in unintended consequences.124  
The best thing that the federal government can do to secure offshore oil 
platforms from cyberattack is turn the ABS standards (set forth in the 
CyberSafety program) and the CFPFPOP (based on the NIST Framework) 
into legally binding regulation overseen by the USCG that all offshore oil 
platforms must follow without exception. While the CyberSafety program 
encompasses more than just offshore oil platforms, at this time the USCG 
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should limit implementation to offshore oil platforms to better integrate the 
CFPFPOP (which is specific to offshore operations). By moving toward the 
ABS and NIST standard mandating that companies obtain some level of 
certification concerning their cyber protocols, the government would be 
instituting much more than just a floor for companies to get above in terms 
of cybersecurity. In doing so, the government would help protect the United 
States and its people from another incident comparable to Deepwater 
Horizon. The best form of regulation is one that successfully outlines a risk-
management procedure that allows companies to establish effective defenses 
for cyberthreats. Offshore oil platforms are a necessary part of our critical 
infrastructure; “[w]hile cybersecurity problems are inevitable, if something 
is deemed a critical infrastructure for the country, it needs to be treated as 
such and subject to competent oversight by qualified government regulators 
to help reduce the costs and consequences of future incidents.”125 It is time 
to move pass industry standard and implement federal regulation that holds 
offshore oil platform owners to a higher standard.  
B. Implementation of Future Regulation 
If the federal government integrated industry standard into the C.F.R. the 
oil and gas industry must then proceed to implement it. For the successful 
implementation of regulation to occur there must be support from the oil and 
gas industry. It is rare for companies to want to take on more regulation; 
“[m]any industries tend to favor self-regulation because it helps keep 
government away, reduces their costs and allows them to keep any problems 
‘inside the family’ and away from public view.”126 Meeting regulatory 
thresholds is expensive for companies; it takes time, money and manpower. 
Garnering the support of the oil and gas industry “will depend on appropriate 
government financial incentives to make compliance costs more 
palatable.”127 The goal of regulation from the perspective of the industry must 
be “to strengthen these companies and secure their growth, not hamstring 
industry or penalize their profits.”128 The more industry has a hand in the 
creation of the regulation, the more likely it is that the industry will support 
the new regulation. 
                                                                                                                 
 125. Richard Forno & Ann Hobson, Should the Government Require Companies to Meet 
Cybersecurity Standards for Critical Infrastructure?, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Nov.12, 
2018, 11:53 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/should-the-government-require-companies-
to-meet-cybersecurity-standards-for-critical-infrastructure-1542041617. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id.  
 128. Id.  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
730 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 4 
  
 
 Assuming, that the industry assents to the regulations, the next hurdle is 
the movement of deregulation that is ongoing under the current executive 
administration. It is the stated goal of President Trump to “reduce the size, 
scope, and cost of federal regulation.”129 While it might be a hard battle to 
implement new federal regulation under the current administration, there is 
no better time or place to do it. Furthermore, leaving better regulation 
practices as a long-term goal for a more pro-regulation presidency is not an 
unreasonable alternative. Implementing change at the international level 
takes too long, and state-by-state regulations would disserve the purpose of 
creating a uniform standard.  
The last hurdle that directly impacts the adoption of suggested regulation 
is the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (“NTTA”). 
Specifically, section 12(d) of the NTTA requires that federal agencies, 
including the USCG, consult with industry groups and adopt industry 
standards where consistent with their regulatory mission.”130 The upside of 
adopting the ABS CyberSafety protocols and the NIST Framework 
CFPFPOP as a means of protecting offshore oil platforms is that the ABS—
which seeks industry input—and the NIST Framework—established with the 
help of the industry—represents the standard of the industry, and stands a 
better chance of surviving the NTTA’s requirements.  
In spite of the hurdles outlined above to potential regulation, the proposed 
framework can still become law. What will determine if it does become law 
is the determination of individuals who see the danger of doing nothing. 
Doing nothing, and allowing platform operators to “self-regulate,” while the 
federal government stands ideally by is no longer an option that the American 
electorate should tolerate. 
VII. Moving Forward—Regulation Without Reward 
There is an understandable apprehension from companies about spending 
large amounts of money on a constantly-evolving problem. Cyberattacks can 
strengthen and morph in a matter of minutes, and competent cybersecurity 
systems that protect offshore oil platforms can be costly, with no guarantee 
that the system will stop every threat. The industry must remember that the 
costs of a cybersecurity defense protocol will inevitably be less expensive 
                                                                                                                 
 129. President Donald Trump, Remarks by President Trump on Deregulation (Dec. 14, 
2017) (transcript available online at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-deregulation/) 
 130. Hannan, supra note 75, at 1025-26. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol4/iss6/2
2019]  Cybersecurity and Offshore Oil 731 
 
 
than a loss of life or significant environmental damage that can occur when 
an attack rises to the level of Deepwater Horizon Disaster.  
Deepwater Horizon contains many examples of the dangers of not 
maintaining an offshore oil rig. As a result of the current state of cyber-
security insurance policies, it is likely that similar issues will occur if a 
Deepwater Horizon-scale disaster is the result of a breakdown in 
cybersecurity. The company who holds the vessel as an asset will likely be 
the only one who covers any damage. There is a higher likelihood that insures 
may be willing to cover more of platforms cybersecurity risks if federal 
regulation is enacted. 
A. Insurance Coverage 
Most insurance policies of offshore oil platforms include liability and 
exclusion clauses if attacks occur as a result of cyberattacks.131 “First, many 
traditional marine insurance policies (hull and machinery, protection and 
indemnity, marine CGL, and specifically the Institute Cyber Attack 
Exclusion Clause (CL380)) often exclude liability for damages arising from 
cyberattacks and risks.”132 This is an example of a standard clause: 
1.1 Subject only to Clause 1.2 below, in no case shall this 
insurance cover loss damage liability or expense directly caused 
by or contributed to by or arising from the use or operation, as a 
means for inflicting harm, of any computer, computer system, 
computer software program, malicious code, computer virus or 
process or any electronic system. 
1.2 Where this clause is endorsed on policies covering risks of 
war, civil war, revolution, rebellion, insurrection, or civil strife 
arising therefrom, or any hostile act by or against a belligerent 
power, or terrorism or any person acting from a political motive, 
Clause 1.1. Shall not operate to exclude losses (which would 
otherwise be covered) arising from the use of any computer, 
computer system computer software program, or any electronic 
system in the launch and/or guidance system and/or firing 
mechanism of any weapon or missile.133 
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 Thus, if there is an attack on an offshore platform that is insured by a 
policy with a cyber-exclusion clause, all damages fall to the company. If 
the company is not able to pay, the government will then shoulder the cost 
of recovery and cleanup. Furthermore, there is no support from insurance 
companies for environmental cleanup, there is little that companies, even 
multi-national conglomerates, can do when potentially facing billions of 
dollars in damages if a cyberattack took place.  
Second, “if an involved company's cybersecurity program is so ill-
advised or nonexistent, in the face of many available industry standards and 
so much regulatory guidance about the importance of cybersecurity, it 
could arguably render a vessel ‘cyber unseaworthy’ – which in turn might 
void any insurance coverage that might otherwise apply.”134 The standard 
that would make a vessel “cyber unseaworthy” has yet to be articulated. 
The assumption is that vessels need some level of cybersecurity, but the 
exact level is unknown. Industry standard helps to articulate the 
cybersecurity threshold companies must meet; but, once again, that does 
little to articulate a threshold as to what an insurer would look for in a stable 
company. Even further, “an incompetent cybersecurity program could 
potentially constitute negligence necessarily within the privity and 
knowledge of the vessel's owner, which could potentially void the owner's 
right to invoke limitation of or exoneration from liability.”135  
Insurance companies are almost as ill-prepared to handle a cyberattack 
on an offshore platform as platform operators. If insurance companies do 
not have an exclusionary policy that would automatically prevent 
companies from recovering in the aftermath of a cyberattack, then the 
ambiguity of what constitutes a competent cybersecurity protocol creates 
an equally devastating—but potentially unwritten—exclusionary policy 
that would prevent companies from recovery.  
B. Liability 
If companies’ policies are not adequate and protocols to prevent 
cyberattack are not in place, companies could be wide open to liability with 
no protection against billion-dollar lawsuits. If companies are not going to 
take their cyberthreats seriously, they need to take their liability coverage 
seriously. Expounding upon what happened to BP:  
After the explosion, litigation ensued between the developer, 
BP, and the insurers of Transocean. Transocean owned the oil 
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drilling rig. The dispute focused on whether and to what extent 
an underlying drilling contract between BP and Transocean 
limited the scope of insurance coverage available to BP as an 
additional insured under Transocean’s insurance policies.136 
After the disaster, when lawsuits started piling up against BP, including 
“numerous personal injury and environmental claims,”137 BP made a 
demand for coverage under the Transocean insurance policy. Following the 
demand, “Transocean’s insurers denied the claim, asserting BP’s additional 
insured status was limited under the drilling contract solely to liability 
assumed by Transocean for above-surface pollution.”138 The case made its 
way to the Supreme Court of Texas, which held that, while the insurance 
policies expressed no limitation to BP’s coverage, BP did not have 
coverage for the lives lost or the environmental destruction that occurred as 
a result of the disaster.139 Deepwater Horizon is a cautionary tale of what 
can happen to a company that does not understand the implications of their 
own insurance policy. Operators of offshore platforms need to clarify what 
implications a cyberattack would have on an insurance policy. 
Insurance coverage for cyber security on offshore platforms is not 
unlimited. In fact, it is extremely limited and comprehensive policies are 
rare, resulting in a serious need for increased cybersecurity industry wide 
simply to avoid the massive liability companies expose themselves to 
otherwise. Companies need to understand that if the government does not 
institute cybersecurity regulation at the federal level it is their responsibility 
to implement industry standard or their own cybersecurity protocol. 
Insurance and liability coverage is not going to cover the monetary damage 
that accumulates following a large-scale disaster, no matter how 
comprehensive it is. Furthermore, it is not likely that insurers will even 
begin to cover companies for cyberattacks until binding federal regulation 
is in place across the oil and gas industry. 
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VIII. Conclusion  
There is not a feasible way to thoroughly and comprehensively protect 
offshore oil platforms in United States from cyberattacks. This fact does 
not mean that there is not a way to enhance the regulatory protections of 
these platforms.  
Terrorists recognize inherent weaknesses in the cybersecurity of 
offshore platforms as evidenced by attacks over the last 15 years on 
industry operations in Turkey, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and the African 
coast. It is likely that attacks will only continue to increase. Attacks 
continue because technology of offshore platforms continues to become 
more complex and more interconnected and the vulnerabilities of platforms 
continue to increase.  
There are international laws that detail how to protect offshore oil 
platforms from a physical attack. These laws outline what offshore oil 
platforms should do to protect themselves; what they could do to protect 
themselves; and what they must do. Government needs to establish 
regulation to help platforms protect themselves from cyberattacks in the 
same way that current international law helps set guideposts to protect 
platforms from physical attacks.  
At the time of publication, no current federal laws establish specific, 
legally binding regulations for cybersecurity on offshore oil platforms. 
Industry standards abound but are not legally binding. The oil and gas 
industry has always been slow to respond to movements in industry 
standard, that is, until government forces have pushed it into action. 
Offshore platforms have better mechanisms for protection if industry 
standard is integrated into governmental oversight and regulation. 
Ultimately, the ramifications of not having government oversight are that 
innocent lives are put in jeopardy and companies are at risk of going 
bankrupt if assurances are not in place to make sure companies are meeting 
cybersecurity standards.  
Ultimately when companies chose cost-saving over safety, those that 
survive without incident falsely demonstrate to others that their behavior 
involves no risk. Should cost-saving become the industry standard over 
cybersecurity (without legally binding federal regulation in place), offshore 
rigs would be vulnerable to an onslaught of terrorist activity causing a true 
environmental and economic crisis. Federal regulation provides a simple, 
effective, and ultimately, budget friendly answer to the threat of 
cyberattack. Looking back, years from now, following a deadly attack that 
cost billions in clean up and environmental destruction, no individual 
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should have the ability to say, “if appropriate regulation existed this attack 
would have been preventable.” Implementation of cybersecurity regulation 
is necessary to prevent the next big threat from becoming a reality.  
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